

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Setting the Table: Majority Party Effects in the United States Senate

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This article joins the growing tide of research that studies party effects in the United States Senate. Previous work has shown that certain procedural tools disproportionately advantage the majority party at the expense of the minority. We build on this research by exploiting a new dataset that allows us to study motions to table amendments from the 91st to the 111th Congress. By examining the success of these motions, analyzing the voting calculus of individual senators on procedural and substantive votes, and simulating the aggregate impact of this tool, we provide some of the strongest evidence to date that political parties (and the majority party in particular) influence the legislative process and policy outcomes in the Senate. Our findings stand in stark contrast to the traditional vision of the Senate as an individualistic body.

> Congress is becoming more like a parliamentary system — where everyone simply votes with their party and those in charge employ every possible tactic to block the other side. But that is not what America is all about, and it's not what the Founders intended. In fact, the Senate's requirement of a supermajority to pass significant legislation encourages its members to work in a bipartisan fashion.
>
> —Olympia Snowe (R-ME)[1]

These words from outgoing Senator Olympia Snowe signify a major trend in American politics. The Senate is evolving into an institution of partisan

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influence and conflict. Although the Senate has historically operated as a forum for deliberation and individual influence (Sinclair 1989), its functioning now reflects the increasingly polarized character of the political elite. Moderates such as Olympia Snowe, and Evan Bayh (D-IN) before her, retired from the Senate as members of their own party ostracized them. After voters in their state parties and Senate colleagues abandoned them, Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and Lisa Murkowski (R-WA) had to seek alternate routes to re-election. Given the current state of affairs in American politics, this is much less surprising than it would have been a generation ago. As activists and office seekers become more polarized, elected officials follow suit. We observe this change in a chamber that the founders, by design, insulated from the whims of an impassioned public.

Although anecdotal accounts indicate an increasingly partisan Senate, it remains difficult to provide evidence of systematic effects of political parties in the chamber beyond polarization in floor voting. After all, a more polarized chamber may be a function of a more partisan membership. Increased party line voting in the Senate may be the natural result of all Senators voting their conscience (Krehbiel 1993) or voting in a manner that their constituents prefer (Mayhew 1974). Although few scholars dispute that the Senate has become more partisan, many still feel that the parties are mere coalitions of ideology rather than active groups that induce changes in behavior and alter outcomes. A similar debate took place on the House (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Krehbiel 1993; Rohde 1991), and researchers discovered strong evidence of party effects in the House that has helped to settle that question (e.g., Young and Wilkins 2007).

We provide new evidence that shows the role political parties play in the Senate beyond ideological homogeneity or electoral responsiveness. Whereas voting scores and roll rates display a broad trend in increasing polarization along partisan lines, we analyze a specific procedural vote that allows us to measure the effect parties have on the floor. The motion to table an amendment (MTT) is a tool to dispose of unwanted amendments. Although it is available to all senators regardless of party, we provide evidence that the majority uses this tool disproportionately in order to skew outcomes in their favor and to relieve electoral pressure from their members. We discuss the usage patterns of these motions, but also the change in individual voting behavior between the more esoteric procedural vote on the MTT and the more visible vote on the underlying policy. Through our analysis of individual vote pairs, we show that party-induced "vote switching" occurs at a significant rate and apply this knowledge to estimate the aggregate influence that partisan procedural tactics have on the amending process in the Senate. We present robust evidence of party effects[2] even where some scholars have long thought them nonexistent.

PREVIOUS LITERATURE

Scholarly interest in the Senate has grown in recent years despite the advantages that those researching the House still hold. From chamber structure to availability of data, the House remains the easier chamber to study, yet enterprising scholars seeking to discover patterns in the behavior of the often idiosyncratic upper chamber have found evidence of party effects in the Senate. From institutional change (Binder and Smith 1998) to roll rates (Campbell, Cox, and McCubbins 2002), leadership behavior (Evans and Lipinski 2005) and the content of the agenda (Lee 2008), experts identify the role parties play in structuring outcomes in the Senate. Some see the advantage held by the majority party as stock prices of party-linked firms that vary with partisan control (Den Hartog and Monroe 2008b). Beth, Heitshusen, Heniff, and Rybicki (2009) examine tactics that the majority leadership can use to their advantage in the legislative process. Unlike the House, where special rules that limit debate often suffice, they argue that the majority leadership in the Senate must rely on several different tools depending on the context of the vote in order to be effective in altering outcomes and protecting members.

The question of whether parties influence the Senate resulted in an edited volume on the subject (Monroe, Roberts, and Rohde 2008), and the upper chamber serves as a proving ground for a new theory of partisan agenda control (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011). One of the most interesting analyses to come out of these works is the study of the motion to table amendments. Research shows that their usage has moved from the hands of the relevant committee chair to the majority party leadership (Marshall, Prins, and Rohde 1999). Den Hartog and Monroe's work on tabling motions is restricted to only a few Congresses (2008a; 2011), but it demonstrates the systematic advantages that the majority holds while using this tool. Compared to minority motions and amendments, majority motions to table and amendments see greater success. Despite all the burgeoning research pointing toward partisan effects in the Senate, some question whether this research explicitly demonstrates the effect of party above and beyond ideological (e.g., Krehbiel 1998) or distributive considerations (e.g., Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). For example, some offer an alternative explanation for the use of motions to table, believing they simply improve the efficiency of the upper chamber (Smith, Ostrander, and Pope 2013). While we agree with their argument that the use of motions to table is sometimes a response to time constraints, we do not believe this precludes the possibility that senators use this tool for partisan gain.

In the past, scholars searching for partisan effects in the House faced a similar dilemma. A large amount of evidence supported the theory that the majority party wields a considerable amount of influence, but there was no piece of lynchpin evidence to settle the debate. This is a common characteristic

of congressional research, which relies on available empirical data. Much to our chagrin, congressional scholars are not afforded the opportunity to experiment on the floor of the House or Senate, however, we can observe situations in which members vote on a given topic in a particular context, and then observe members voting on the same policy in a different context. Oftentimes, this change in context corresponds to a change in vote type (i.e., procedural vs. substantive vote) or pressure from party leaders. This allows researchers to examine the effect that the context surrounding a particular vote has on the decision-making process and draw inferences about the underlying motivations of individual member behavior.

Although opportunities for such theoretical leverage are not commonplace, scholars take advantage when they reveal themselves. Brady and Sinclair (1984) were the first to analyze the phenomenon of vote switching in legislation on the Great Society. They find that certain members "switch" their vote based on the ideological preferences of their constituents. In addition, some members of the House switch their vote between a procedural vote on a motion to recommit and a substantive vote on the final passage of a bill. In other words, an individual may vote for a motion to recommit only to later support the bill on final passage.[3] The underlying policy remains constant, but some members have an incentive to change their votes. Scholars offer several reasons for why members will change their votes. One common argument is that member votes may be bought (Buchanan and Lee 1986; Groseclose 1996; Jenkins and Monroe 2012). Scholars invoke this concept of vote-buying in accounting for the influence of extra-legislative actors such as interest groups (Denzau and Munger 1986; Groseclose and Snyder 1996) and the presidency (Jenkins and Nokken 2008). Others point to influences within the chamber that may foster vote switching between House special rules votes and subsequent final passage votes (Sinclair 2002; Young and Wilkins 2007). Even in situations where the bill remained unchanged between the rules vote and the final passage vote, several members switched positions. Nearly all of the switching involved majority members voting with their party on the procedural vote and voting against their party on the final passage vote. Butler and Sempolinski (2012) provide evidence of this phenomenon in the Senate. They analyze the differences in behavior between votes on cloture and the corresponding final passage vote. Consistent with other research, they find majority party members side with their party on cloture votes but are much less united on the vote for final passage, even though the roll calls appear to carry the same policy implications.

As part of the analysis to follow, we examine cases where a vote on an amendment takes place after a failed motion to table. These vote pairs show evidence of senators switching their votes in a manner that strongly suggests party influence.

PARTY INCENTIVES AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES

We argue that the majority party would like to secure outcomes in its favor, or, away from the chamber median and toward the median member of their party caucus. To reach their individual and collective goals (either policy or electoral), the party caucus delegates power to party leaders who use their authority by blocking legislation that they do not favor or by advancing popular legislation that they would like to pass (Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2005). A Senate majority leader hoping to tilt outcomes toward his party's preferences faces several challenges that his counterpart in the House does not. The Senate developed as a much more individualistic and less partisan chamber (Sinclair 1989). There are few efficient ways to cut off debate on a topic, in most circumstances discussion of a topic need not be germane, and perhaps most importantly, the Senate lacks a rules committee that can restrict amending activity on a bill via a majority vote. This leads to a situation where individuals (especially members of the minority party) can wreak havoc at the expense of the majority party. One of the surest ways to stall or derail the legislative program of the majority party is to offer amendments to bills.

Still, we argue that Senate parties have resources to offer individual senators beyond their ideological cohesion. Although the Senate majority party does not enjoy as great a differential in power over the Senate minority that the House majority party has over the House minority, we argue that the power differential does exist in the upper chamber. The majority party leadership enjoys several advantages over the minority party, not the least of which is the majority leader's right of first recognition. As a result of advantages like this, it is easier for the majority party to pass legislation. In the parlance of Den Hartog and Monroe's (2011) costly consideration framework, while the minority party also attempts to secure legislative outcomes and influence the behavior of its members, it is less costly for the majority party than for the minority party to bring a legislative agenda to the floor and pass it.

There are various reasons why amendments (and in particular those offered by the minority party) are dangerous to the majority party (both for its members individually and its collective brand) if brought to an up or down vote on the floor. When acting as faithful agents of the majority party, committees and their chairs produce bills that are palatable to the majority party caucus. As a result, most controversial or destructive attempts to alter the bill originate from the minority party (e.g., Wilkerson 1999). These amendments serve to alter the policy content of the bill, diminish its likelihood of passing, or force members into taking a vote on something that would be electorally damaging.[4] Amendments can be dangerous to both the policy implications of the underlying bill and to the agenda of the entire session, as well as

threatening the electoral interests of the majority party. Amendments also may exhaust plenary time (Smith et al. 2013). In addition, a majority of the majority party may not prefer the policy changes to the bill encapsulated by the amendment (Cox and McCubbins 1993), and the inclusion of some amendments may even endanger the passage of the entire bill. Furthermore, certain amendments may force Senators to take positions on an issue that they would rather not broadcast to the public. To be sure, members of the majority party could also offer a dangerous amendment, which may highlight divisions within the majority party caucus. Regardless of their source, some amendments are problematic for the collective interests of the majority party as well as the interests of individual senators.

Faced with this institutional impediment to majority influence, majority party leaders must work strategically to manipulate the proceedings on the floor away from the chamber median. The majority uses a number of tools depending on context, from budgetary points of order to cloture (King, Orlando, and Rohde 2012). One of the more noted weapons the Senate majority party can use to control the debate on the floor is the motion to table, specifically the motion to table amendments (Carson, Madonna, and Owens 2011; Gold 2008; Goodman 2010; Oleszek 2013). If a member offers an amendment, it can easily be set aside via tabling if only a simple majority of senators agree to the motion. A tabling motion is privileged on the floor (Binder, Madonna, and Smith 2007; Oleszek 2013). Once a senator offers a tabling motion, a vote on that motion must take place before debate on the underlying bill or amendment can continue. Unwanted bills (or more often, amendments) that senators would like to see removed from consideration can be killed off easily (if perhaps only temporarily).[5]

What leads party members to vote with their party beyond simple ideological and electoral convergence of beliefs? We argue that three main factors influence vote choice on these procedural votes; in each case, these factors help members achieve their various individual and collective goals (e.g., Fenno 1978): (1) benefits that flow from the party to the member, (2) the presence of private incentives, and (3) the importance of power and agenda control, or maintaining/achieving majority party status. First, there are particularized benefits that parties can dole out to members that support the party position more often than not. Our theoretical point here builds on the vote-buying literature discussed above (Buchanan and Lee 1986; Denzau and Munger 1986; Groseclose 1996; Groseclose and Snyder 1996; Jenkins and Monroe 2012; Jenkins and Nokken 2008). In addition to interest groups or the president buying votes in the legislature, we argue that party leaders can also buy the votes of their members at the margin, by offering various incentives to induce their preferred behavior. Minority leaders can use this strategy; however, we argue that the majority party has more resources to buy support on procedural votes than the minority party does.

Second, senators also care greatly about their private policy preferences. Procedural tools allow members to vote their ideology instead of their constituency. Although we do not believe MTTs happen in an electoral vacuum, senators presume that a vote on a procedural question will cause less damage than a similar action on the underlying amendment. Rather than forcing members to cast difficult or embarrassing votes only to face retribution from an active constituency, the party leadership and the Rules Committee in the House craft special rules (Arnold 1992; Oleszek 2013; Theriault 2006; 2008; Van Houweling 2003; 2008; Weaver 1986). Although involving different forms of procedure, we believe this logic extends to the Senate and motions to table amendments. By supporting tabling motions that eliminate amendments, senators are decreasing the likelihood that members of their party will need to make difficult decisions.

Third, the collective goal of maintaining or becoming the majority often influences the votes of individual members. Procedural votes may help secure policy and electoral interests of individual members; however, research shows that these votes are also a function of partisan team play. Frances Lee (2009) argues that procedural votes are extremely partisan for reasons that go beyond ideology. Although the leadership sometimes still plays a major role, Lee posits three factors that result in high levels of partisanship on procedural and parliamentary votes as party teams seek power. First, members treat these votes very differently from substantive votes, as they are a crucial part of executing the party's broader legislative strategy. Just as procedural votes provide cover for senators to follow their private preferences, they also allow senators to support the goals of their party. Second, procedural votes are necessary to ensure collective agreements remain intact despite attempts of the minority to unravel them. And last, she sees the highly partisan battle over procedure as a fight over control of the agenda.

To summarize our theoretical thrust, the majority party in the Senate would like to push policy away from the median member of the chamber and toward the median member of their party. They attempt to achieve this by utilizing several imperfect tools, such as the motion to table amendments. As Den Hartog and Monroe (2011) argue, they are able to do this because they pay a smaller agenda setting cost to pursue their legislative agenda than does the minority party. Members care about their standing with the electorate. Although the electoral cost of voting against one's state on a substantive vote is large, senators presume there is less cost when voting against one's state on a procedural vote. Members can more easily incur this discounted cost, especially when we consider the benefits that an individual may accrue by voting with their party. Whereas both parties can provide incentives to encourage their members to support the party's position, the majority party has greater resources at their disposal.

We test Den Hartog and Monroe's hypotheses (2008a) in addition to a leadership hypothesis:

> H1: Motions to table offered by majority party members are more likely to be adopted than motions to table offered by minority party members, ceteris paribus.
>
> H2: Motions to table that target amendments sponsored by members of the minority party are more likely to be adopted than the tabling motions that target amendments sponsored by members of the majority party, c.p.
>
> H3: Motions to table offered by the majority party leader are more likely to pass than those offered by rank and file members of the majority party, c.p.

While members often support their party on procedural votes, we believe it is more likely when party leaders offer the tabling motions. This strong signal highlights the importance of the procedural tactic in achieving collective goals, and it will induce even greater party line voting (H3). At the same time, we expect the majority leader will be more successful than the minority leader is at employing this procedural tool.

DATA AND METHODS

We utilize data from a new database of Senate roll call votes, which includes nearly 17,000 votes from the 91st to the 111th Congress (1969–2011). We see clear differences in the way members treat amendments versus motions to table amendments. For example, the 110th Congress adopted 94% of all MTTs, which is extremely high number compared to the 42% of amendments that the Senate agreed to during that session. We also see that these votes are usually partisan and becoming more partisan over time.[6] We find that on average, majority party members offer over 80% of MTTs (a proportion substantially higher than the majority's share of the membership), which points to the majority party attempting to control floor activity. Motions to table target minority amendments much more frequently than they target majority motions, and this disparity has grown since the beginning of the period covered by our database. We also observe that in nearly every Congress for which we have data, voting on MTTs is more partisan than voting on amendments, which indicates the parties acting beyond ideological preferences. When we take the absolute difference in the support of roll calls between the two parties, motions to table amendments are consistently more polarizing than substantive amendments. This holds even though the parties are growing more polarized on both sets of votes.

Votes on tabling evidently yield more partisan results; however, perhaps tabling motions simply touch upon issues that are more divisive. It is possible

that amendments that are more partisan in nature are more likely to face a tabling motion. This selection effect could bias our measures of partisanship, however, in the analysis to follow, we control for the ideological content of amendments.

Although we are primarily concerned with the impact of party (the party of the individual offering the motion to table and the party of the member that sponsored the underlying amendment), we control for a number of additional factors that may explain the success rates of motions to table. We create a series of indicator variables and interactions to compare the predicted adoption rates of MTTs sponsored by majority and minority party leaders, committee leaders, and committee members. For example, members of the reporting committee may hold more sway and their decision to offer a motion to table may be more successful for a variety of reasons, including policy expertise (Krehbiel 1993). Likewise, we expect sponsorship by majority members of the committee to increase the probability of success, and we expect that relationship to be even greater when the "motioner" (the senator offering the motion to table) is the chair of the reporting committee.

In order to control for ideology, we follow Den Hartog and Monroe's (2008a; 2011) strategy that uses Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores. The position of a legislator along the ideology spectrum affects the likelihood of a successful motion to table or an amendment. "*Motioner Distance"* is the absolute value of the difference between the first dimension score of the member who moves to table an amendment and the chamber median. The greater this distance, the less likely a motion to table will be adopted as those closer to the chamber median will support the underlying amendment. Conversely, a more moderate member (low "motioner distance") may offer a motion to table as a way to seek political cover. With other cross-pressured members near the floor median in a similar position, the motion to table has a higher likelihood of success. Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient in our model for "motioner distance."

Similarly, "*Sponsor Distance"* is the absolute value of the difference in nominate scores of the sponsor of the underlying amendment and the chamber median. More extreme members will sponsor more extreme amendments. In the face of a motion to table, more extreme amendments will fall at a higher rate than more moderate amendments. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on this variable in our analysis. Lacking an ideological score for each motion, there is no way to control for the actual policy content of the amendment, but we deem that member ideology acts as a sufficient proxy. We believe, as Den Hartog and Monroe did, that controlling for ideology in this way should allow us to see the true nature of party effects in the Senate and success on motions to table.

We analyze the success rates of MTTs using a probit model where we code the dependent variable as one if the MTT passed and zero if it failed.[7]

The model takes the following form[8]:

$$\Pr(\text{Passage of MTT}|X) = \Phi(X'\beta) \text{ where Pr is probability, } \Phi \text{ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and } X'\beta :$$
$$\beta_0+\beta_1[\text{MajMotioner}]+\beta_2[\text{PartyLeader}]$$
$$+\beta_3[\text{MajMotioner}^*\text{PartyLeader}]$$
$$+\beta_4[\text{PartyWhip}]+\beta_5[\text{MajMotioner}^*\text{PartyWhip}]+\beta_6[\text{CommLeader}]$$
$$+\beta_7[\text{MajMotioner}^*\text{CommLeader}]$$
$$+\beta_8[\text{CommitteeMember}]+\beta_9[\text{CommitteeMember}^*\text{MajMotioner}]$$
$$+\beta_{10}[\text{MinorityAmdt}]+\beta_{11}[\text{MotionerDistance}]$$
$$+\beta_{12}[\text{SponsorDistance}]$$

Analyzing the Success of Tabling Motions

As shown in Table 1, the results allow us to reject the null hypothesis at a high level of certainty for each of our three hypotheses. The Senate is more likely to agree to motions to table offered by majority members than motions to table offered by minority members (H1). Given the positive coefficient for "Minority Amdt," MTTs that target amendments sponsored by the minority have a much greater chance of success than MTTs that target majority amendments (H2). Finally, when the majority leader offers a motion to table, the likelihood of adoption is greater than the adoption rate for motions offered by rank and file members of the majority party (H3)[9]. The majority leader offering a MTT results in a greater chance of success; however, the opposite occurs when a minority leader tries to table an amendment.

Given the probit specification and the interactions included, it is worth examining the marginal effects of several significant variables.[10] The probability of success for a motion to table offered by a rank and file member of the minority party and targeting a majority amendment is 69.9% (i.e., Maj Motioner = 0, Minority Amendment = 0). The frequent success of minority MTTs may be surprising, but it is important to remember that the minority is offering far fewer MTTs. This percentage may seem high, but minority members are more likely to move to table an amendment when they have a decent chance of succeeding given the higher agenda setting costs they face in comparison to members of the majority party (Den Hartog and Monroe 2008a). When a majority member targets a minority amendment with a MTT, the probability increases to 83.3% (i.e., Maj Motioner = 1, Minority Amendment = 1).

We hypothesized that the Senate is more likely to agree to a MTT offered by the majority leader compared to a motion offered by a rank and file member of the party (H3). The interactions in Table 1 afford strong evidence for this prediction. When the majority leader offers a MTT targeting

TABLE 1. doption of Motions to Table Amendments 91st–111th Senate

Adoption of MTT	Coef. SE
Maj Motioner	.157*
	0.087
Party Leader	–.506*
	0.261
Maj X Party Leader	.799***
	0.289
Party Whip	.915**
	0.377
Maj X Party Whip	–.778*
	0.41
Comm Leader	.184
	0.213
Maj X Comm Leader	.019
	0.234
Committee	.291*
	0.165
Maj X Committee	–.335*
	0.182
Minority Amdt	.287***
	0.062
Motioner Distance	–.890***
	0.171
Sponsor Distance	.586***
	0.143
Cons.	1.107***
	0.319
n	3232
Pseudo R^2	0.0762
Log-likelihood	–1520.1378

* = $p < .1$ ** = $p < .05$ *** = $p < .01$.
Note: Model controls for the unit effects of each Congress (not shown).

a minority amendment, the likelihood of success is 90.3% (i.e., Maj Motioner = 1, Minority Amendment = 1, Party Leader = 1, Maj X Party Leader = 1). Interestingly, the Senate is less likely to agree to a MTT offered by the minority leader (i.e., Maj Motioner = 0, Party Leader = 1, Maj X Party Leader = 0) than one offered by a rank and file minority member (59.2% versus 77%).

The control variables for ideology behave exactly as we expected. The likelihood of success for the motion to table decreases as the "motioner" becomes more extreme. On the other hand, the likelihood of adoption increases as the sponsor of the underlying amendment becomes more extreme. Although we mirror some results from previous research, the larger scope of our database and our more specified model gives our results added credibility.

Parties play a part beyond both committee and ideological influences. Indeed, a key variable in our model is the party of the underlying amendment sponsor. Given the theoretical importance of agenda control in the Senate, this is precisely what we would expect. Minority amendments are likely much more dangerous to the bill than majority amendments. Minority amendments may force majority members to take stands on controversial issues in addition to altering the overall policy content of the bill away from the majority's preferred position. Defeating these amendments is a priority, and our results show just how successful the majority party is in fulfilling this objective. These results hold even when we control for the size of the seat advantage for the majority party.

Analysis of Vote Pairs: Vote Switching as Evidence of Party Pressure

The results from the adoption analysis seem persuasive, but the possibility exists that the Senate is more likely to agree to majority MTTs merely because there are simply more members of the majority, even while holding the ideology of the "motioner" constant. To address this issue we examine the votes of individual legislators on 93 cases where an MTT failed and there was a recorded vote directly on the underlying amendment. We acknowledge these cases represent a small portion of the entire roll call record, yet examining the voting behavior of legislators in these instances is still instructive. These votes cover a variety of issues and take place in a number of different institutional contexts over a wide period. Congressional scholars have focused on vote switching to establish partisan influence in the past. For example, Brady and Sinclair (1984) examine switching between motions to recommit and final passage votes, whereas others look at rules votes in the House (Sinclair 2002; Young and Wilkins 2007) as well as cloture votes in the Senate (Butler and Sempolinski 2012). We view votes on motions to table and amendments as even more closely connected than these other vote pairs.[11]

To be sure, the Senate frequently adopts amendments after a failed motion to table by voice vote. In these cases, members have additional electoral cover as there is no record of their individual votes. At the same time, recorded roll call votes do occur after a failed motion to table and there is no guarantee that the amendment will succeed. In fact, 18% of the time an amendment received a recorded vote after a failed MTT, the amendment failed (n=17).[12] Even when the Senate decided in favor of an amendment, the votes were far from unanimous. Though the frequency of these vote pairs is limited, these are the instances when partisan maneuvering matters most.

It is difficult to control for the diverse policy content and varying levels of extremity of amendments in our aggregate analysis of adoption rates for motions to table; however, the following analysis of vote pairs has several advantages. We can identify the voting behavior of individual members, but most important, we believe the vote pairs we analyze (an individual legislator's

vote on the MTT and the vote on the amendment) serve as a control for the ideological content of the underlying amendment. Although we argue the political decision-making differs between vote types, the policy issue at hand is the same for the procedural MTT vote and the substantive vote on the amendment. In the aggregate analysis, we are unable to control for the substantive content of all the amendments associated with all motions to table. When we examine vote pairs, if members treat a vote on the MTT the same as voting on the amendment, we should see senators voting in a *consistent* fashion. This means that if a senator voted to table an amendment he or she would vote against the underlying amendment. Likewise, if a senator votes against the tabling motion, a consistent position would be to vote for the underlying amendment.

If a legislator votes for a MTT and for the amendment, or votes against the MTT and against the amendment, we consider these *inconsistent* positions. This signifies that members treat the procedural and substantive votes differently; we believe political parties often influence legislators to vote with the party on procedural votes, thereby allowing members to vote their ideology on the underlying amendment. For example, we expect some members of the majority party to vote for a motion to table a minority sponsored amendment, then eventually voting for the amendment. Conversely, we expect members of the minority party may vote to table an amendment sponsored by a member of the majority party only to later vote for the amendment. The 93 roll call pairs give us 8,291 complete senator vote pairs, of which 910 are inconsistent. This means that nearly 11% of the time, senators vote to keep something off the floor, but ultimately vote for it, or they vote to allow an amendment on the floor, but then vote against it.

Based off our expectations, we test the following three hypotheses:

> H4: More extreme members will be less likely to cast a "partisan-influenced" inconsistent vote on adoption of the amendment than less extreme members, ceteris paribus.
>
> H5: Majority members are more likely than minority party members are to vote for the MTT then vote for the amendment sponsored by members of the minority, c.p.
>
> H6: Majority members are less likely than minority party members are to vote for the MTT then vote for the amendment sponsored by members of the majority, c.p.

Table 2 shows the breakdown of vote combinations on MTT-Amendment vote pairs, split by whether a member of the majority or the minority party sponsored the underlying amendment. We examine 2,939 vote pairs on motions to table a minority amendment (left pane) and 5,352 vote pairs on motions to table majority amendments (right pane). We label each cell with our general expectation for which legislators are most likely to fall into each

TABLE 2. Vote Pair Combinations: Expectations and Occurrences

Minority Amendment				Majority Amendment			
		Amendment Vote				Amendment Vote	
		Yea	Nay			Yea	Nay
Motion to Table Vote	Nay	59% Consistent Minority Position (44%/79%)	3% Idiosyncratic (2%/3%)	Motion to Table Vote	Nay	57% Consistent Majority Position (71%/40%)	5% Idiosyncratic (5%/5%)
	Yea	8% Majority Partisan Influence (10%/4%)	31% Consistent Majority Position (44%/14%)		Yea	6% Minority Partisan Influence (4%/9%)	31% Consistent Minority Position (20%/46%)
n = (2939/1643/1296)				n = (5352/3030/2322)			
% Overall Hypothesized Behavior (%Maj/%Min)							

Note: Percentages represent the % of members whose vote pair falls in each category. For example, when the underlying amendment was offered by a member of the minority, 10% of majority members voted yea on the MTT and yea on the amendment

of the four possible vote pairings (Yea or Nay on the MTT, and Yea or Nay on the Amendment). Each cell includes 3 percentages: (1) the percent of all vote pairs that fall in the cell; (2) the percent of vote pairs by majority members that fall in the cell (first percentage in parentheses); and (3) the percent of vote pairs by minority party members that fall in the cell (second percentage in parentheses).[13] We are primarily concerned with explaining the inconsistent vote pairs (or vote switching) in the bottom left cell for both majority and minority amendments as these are the instances we believe party influence is most likely.

Focus first on the left pane where legislators consider a minority amendment. If legislators vote strictly on policy preferences, we expect most majority party members to vote to table the amendment and then vote against the amendment (MTT Vote = Y, AMDT Vote = N); most minority party members will vote against the tabling motion and then vote for the amendment (MTT Vote = N, AMDT Vote = Y). The results confirm our expectations as 44% of majority members and 79% of minority members voting consistently. When we focus on the "Majority Partisan Influence" cells (bottom left cell in each pane) we see 10% of majority members voting for the motion to table and then voting for the amendment. If these legislators are voting on the basis of their policy preferences, this inconsistent behavior does not make sense.

When we examine the right pane where legislators consider a majority amendment, our expectations for consistent vote pairs flip (majority members:

MTT = N, AMDT = Y; minority members: MTT = Y, AMDT = N). Our data reveal that 71% of majority members and 46% of minority members vote in this consistent fashion, but when we examine inconsistent vote pairs in the bottom left cell, minority members are more likely to fall in this category (9%) compared to majority members (4%).

Inconsistent vote pairs occur in circumstances we expect, yet it is interesting to compare the instances of party influence (lower left cells) between the majority and minority party. When comparing the frequency of party induced switching on amendments offered by the opposite party, the majority and minority party are similar (10% for the majority and 9% for the minority). Using the costly consideration framework (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011), we know that party leaders of both parties try to influence the behavior of their members to reach party goals; Table 2 shows leaders on both sides of the aisle are often successful in this effort. However, due to the asymmetric agenda setting costs and as demonstrated in our empirical models, the majority party is much more effective in translating this party pressure into aggregate outcomes.

To be sure, there are plausible scenarios where members of both parties fall into each of the four cells in Table 2 based off their policy preferences or other factors. For example, some members of the majority party may actually support tabling an ideological majority amendment only to support the amendment after the MTT fails. Or, some members may vote against a motion to table and then vote against the amendment. Our theory does not specifically address these pairs we dub "idiosyncratic"; it may be that these members prefer open debate and therefore vote against a procedure that closed the amendment process independent of their views on the underlying amendment. It is impossible to predict the vote pairs of every member of the chamber, but the presence of inconsistent vote pairs suggest some legislators will support their party on the procedural vote despite their support for the underlying amendment.[14]

To understand the motivation for inconsistent votes between the MTT and the amendment, we run two different models depending on the sponsor of the underlying amendment to predict the likelihood that each member will switch votes in the direction that suggests partisan influence. As shown in Table 3, the left pane models the likelihood of switching on minority amendments, while the focus in the right pane is on vote switching on majority amendments. As before, we control for the various leadership and committee posts that might influence voting behavior. The main independent variables are twofold: (1) a member's ideological extremity measured by first dimension DW-Nominate scores—*Abs(DW1)*, and (2) whether they are a member of the majority party—*Majority Member*. According to our theory, members located near the middle of the distribution will likely face cross pressure from constituents and their party. As a result, a

TABLE 3. Vote Switching on Motions to Table Amendments, 91st–111th Senate

Majority Influenced (Minority Amdt)	Coef. SE	Minority Influenced (Majority Amdt)	Coef. SE
Abs(DW1)	–.579**	Abs(DW1)	–.463**
	0.256		0.199
Majority Member	.567***	Majority Member	–.488***
	0.096		0.070
Party Leader	–4.223	Party Leader	0.014
	189.224		0.278
Maj X Party Leader	4.429	Maj X Party Leader	0.611
	189.225		0.377
Party Whip	.251	Party Whip	-.374
	0.408		0.350
Maj X Party Whip	–.082	Maj X Party Whip	0.284
	0.524		0.509
Comm Leader	dropped	Comm Leader	–0.076
			0.319
Maj X Comm Leader	dropped	Maj X Comm Leader	1.135***
			0.410
Committee	.141	Committee	–0.09
	0.199		0.123
Maj X Committee	–.298	Maj X Committee	-0.095
	0.240		0.181
Cons.	2.531***	Cons.	1.928***
	0.378		0.080
n	2910	n	4465
Pseudo R^2	0.208	Pseudo R^2	0.188
Log-likelihood	–627.131	Log-likelihood	–979.770

* = p < .1 ** = p < .05 *** = p < .01.
Note: Models control for the unit effects of each bill and Congress (not shown).

switch in voting is more likely. Members near the tail of the distribution will most likely vote consistently because they should be less vulnerable to election challenges. Our dependent variable is coded one if a member votes to table the amendment, but then votes for the underlying amendment; otherwise, it is coded as a 0. These probit models take the following form[15]:

$$\Pr(\text{Partisan Switch}|X) = F\Phi(X'\beta) \text{ where Pr is probability, } \Phi \text{ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and } X'\beta:$$
$$\beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{abs(DWNom1)}] + \beta_2[\text{MajMember}] + \beta_3[\text{PartyLeader}] + \beta_4[\text{MajMotioner*PartyLeader}] + \beta_5[\text{PartyWhip}] + \beta_6[\text{MajMotioner*PartyWhip}] + \beta_7[\text{CommLeader}] + \beta_8[\text{MajMotioner*CommLeader}] + \beta_9[\text{CommitteeMember}] + \beta_{10}[\text{CommitteeMember*MajMotioner}]$$

Table 4. Probability of Vote Switching, by Majority Status and Amendment Sponsor

	Switch by Majority Member		Switch by Minority Member	
Ideology	Minority Amdt	Majority Amdt	Minority Amdt	Majority Amdt
Moderate	7.6%	3.4%	2.7%	10.0%
Extreme	3.6%	1.7%	0.7%	4.6%

Note: The probability of switching (supporting a motion to table, then vote in favor of an amendment) based off DW-Nominate Scores for select members of the 111th Senate.

We find significant results for both of our key variables. More extreme members are less likely to switch. Conversely, this means that as a member becomes more centrist, he or she is more likely to cast inconsistent votes. After supporting their party on the procedural vote, moderate legislators may vote inconsistently in response to personal policy preferences or pressure from their constituents.[16] In addition, we find that majority members are much more likely than minority members are to support the motion to table the amendment originally, but then switch to supporting it on the substantive amendment vote. Using the ideology of well-known members of 111th Senate as examples, we find strong marginal effects (displayed in Table 4).[17] Consider Russ Feingold (D-WI), a liberal member of majority party in the 111th Senate. According to our model, he would have a 3.6% chance of switching as a member of the majority dealing with a minority amendment. A more moderate member of the Democratic Caucus, Evan Bayh (D-IN) has an 7.6% chance of casting a yea vote on passage after voting to table based on his ideological score. Although these percentages seem small, they are quite large relative to the amount of switching our model predicts for minority members. A moderate member of the minority in the 111th Senate, Olympia Snowe (R-ME), will vote to adopt a minority amendment after voting to table the amendment just under 3% of the time. A more conservative member of the minority party, Tom Coburn (R-OK), will exhibit this same inconsistency under 1% of the time according to our model. Although vote switching is relatively rare, it is much more prevalent among members of the majority, especially among centrist members.

Next, we examine the likelihood of vote switching on majority amendments to determine the extent to which the minority party leadership pressures members of their caucus. Although the minority does not have an equal amount of institutional incentives to offer, it is no doubt acting to influence vote decisions. Here, when we run the same test on majority amendments where tabling failed, we expect to see the same relationship between extremity and inconsistency; however, we should see that majority members are much less

likely than minority members are to table their own amendments yet vote for them if the MTT fails.

Once again, we see that more extreme members are significantly less likely to switch than members that are more moderate. We also find strong evidence for our hypothesis that majority members are less likely to act in a way that implies minority party influence. The marginal effects make the picture even clearer. Using the same set of senators, we find that majority status and extremity matter a great deal. In this case, moderate Evan Bayh's (D-IN) likelihood of tabling a majority amendment and then voting to adopt it is 3.4%, while consistent party supporter Russ Feingold's (D-WI) likelihood is only 1.7%. For minority members dealing with majority amendments, we see the likelihood of switching increasing as members become more moderate, as expected. A strong member of the minority such as Tom Coburn (R-OK) switches 4.6% of the time, whereas moderate Olympia Snowe (R-ME) has a 10% chance of switching from restricting access to a majority amendment to supporting that same amendment on final adoption.

Our analysis demonstrates that not all switching is equivalent. Majority members are much more likely to feel and act on the pressure to control the agenda when dealing with minority amendments, even when the beliefs of their constituents or their personal preferences lie elsewhere. The same is true of minority members when dealing with majority amendments. The asymmetries in switching between the majority and minority offer strong evidence that party factors are present on MTT votes. This is clear evidence that parties influence the vote choices of senators.

Motions to Table and Aggregate Influence on Outcomes

We extend our analysis in order to present the macro implications of micro-level vote decisions. Using the estimates of party influence gleaned from the switcher analysis, we approximate the aggregate policy effect in a world where the majority party lacks the ability to table amendments. We include each successful motion to table in our analysis. In these cases, an up or down vote on the underlying amendment did not take place. We assume that partisans vote consistently most of the time, however, as our previous models identify, switching does take place depending on a number of factors.

Following this logic, we "simulate" the amendment vote that never took place. We account for the ideology of the member proposing the amendment, the party and majority status of the individual senator, and of course, the original vote choice of the senator on the MTT. Once we identified the probability that members will switch on each vote, we conduct a series of simulations ($n = 1000$) on each roll call in order to estimate the probability that the amendment would have succeeded had it received a clear up or down vote. Although it may seem insignificant that one member of the Senate has a 10% chance of switching his or her vote on a hypothetical amendment, if the vote on the

Figure 1. Amendment Stimulation



motion to table was relatively close, there is a non-trivial chance that enough members could switch their votes so the Senate would agree to the underlying amendment.

Over the 21 congresses in our dataset, 2,653 motions to table amendments were successful. The vote margin for the adoption of amendments ranged from as many as 100 votes in a few instances to the six cases where the vice president cast the decisive vote. For each vote, we ran 1,000 simulations and calculated the average adoption rate for the underlying amendment.[18] Accounting for just under 50% of all passed MTTs, Figure 1 shows the summary of each vote simulation where the motion to table won by as many as 20 votes. If the margin of victory is sufficiently high, there is no possibility that the Senate would agree to the amendment given the rate of switching we expect. For MTTs with a margin of victory of 10 or fewer votes, the average amendment has a 22.5% chance of adoption. If the margin of victory was 5 or less, this percentage increases to 37.8%. In fact, according to our estimates 62

amendments would have had a greater than 50% chance of adoption had an up or down vote been held. Although we are not able to quantify systematically the significance of the policy content of these amendments, these simulations offer evidence that the motion to table is a useful tool when the majority party seeks to restrict any attempts to derail or alter legislation currently on the floor. This is especially important when the distribution of seats between the parties in the Senate is close, and when parties vote more cohesively on roll call votes.

Consider a prominent example of an amendment that would have likely succeeded in the 110th Congress without a tabling motion. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) offered an amendment to the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, one of the bills that the new Democratic majority in Congress wished to pass early in the session (Zappone 2007). His amendment would have extended tax breaks to small businesses in order to offset the increased cost that those companies would have incurred by paying employees higher wages. Kyl continuously mentioned the bipartisan support his amendment received in committee, but after a full debate on the amendment took place, Senator Max Baucus moved to table the amendment. The motion to table succeeded by one vote, with only three members crossing party lines. Given the context of the amendment, our model predicts that had the amendment received a straight up or down vote, the Senate would have agreed to it 63% of the time. This is precisely the type of amendment that the majority party would like to see tabled; if voters support assistance for small businesses, a vote against small business tax cuts could make the difference in a close campaign.[19] The Democratic majority may not have endorsed this amendment for a variety of reasons, including adding cost to the overall bill, whereas some individuals may have been against the amendment for ideological reasons. The motion to table allowed them to pursue the private preferences that are in line with the rest of their party at low risk. This is just one example; many of the other amendment votes that the Senate may have agreed to share similar characteristics.

Of course, there are several caveats to undertaking this sort of analysis. Among them is the possibility the tabling motions that succeed are fundamentally different from those that fail. The most obvious example of the differences between these two types of votes is the success of the motions. To be sure, political parties (and the majority party in particular) will not try to influence the voting behavior of members all the time. Rather, pressure from the leadership will most likely occur when the party cannot reach its goals without such pressure.

Discussion

Although previous research has provided evidence to the contrary, some still argue that parties play little to no role in the Senate beyond grouping together like-minded individuals. They contend that there is little to no compulsory

or persuasive power placed on members to act in a certain way while on the floor; however, we uncovered voting patterns on motions to table and amendments that have no plausible explanation that does not include party. What would compel a member to switch their vote in the observed manner? Some believe that the motion to table is primarily a tool to save plenary time and is divorced from any partisan usage (Smith et al. 2013). We agree that it is plausible that some tabling activity is a response to time pressures.[20] Members may prefer to table amendments as opposed to simply voting down an amendment to save time. When faced with an up or down vote on an amendment, senators would then be free to vote their personal ideology or in line with the ideological preferences of their constituents. When, however, we examine the circumstances around which these motions to table occur on the Senate floor, this explanation carries considerably less weight.

If members are using motions to table exclusively to save time, we should see amendments dispensed with immediately on the floor.[21] This is simply not the case. In fact, in our limited sampling of floor debates, several of the amendments that the Senate eventually tables receive full time for debate and are even included in the unanimous consent agreement on certain bills. If we harken back to the example of the Kyl amendment used in the previous section, we observe a structured debate on an amendment that the Senate would ultimately table. Based on the *Congressional Record*, majority floor manager Max Baucus always planned to table the amendment. Prior to the debate Baucus announced, "At the appropriate time, I will move to table the amendment" (*Congressional Record*, January 31, 2007).

It may be possible that members are not voting in any certain way because of party pressure, but because of their complex network of support or friendship (e.g., Fowler 2006). In this scenario, it is not the party leadership that is influencing votes, but the senator's social network that causes vote switching. The argument follows that members are more likely to interact with members of their own party because of similar opinions on issues and other factors. If this occurs, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of party pressure.

In order to gain leverage on this critique, we analyze the behavior of both Jim Jeffords and Arlen Specter on MTTs before and after their party switch in the 107th and 111th Congress, respectively. If procedural votes are linked with social networks, we hypothesize that vote choice would not vary with party affiliation. If, however, we find that voting behavior does change, this serves as additional evidence that party status influences vote choice on procedural votes. The results are unequivocal. Both Jeffords and Specter showed significant changes in voting behavior and the amount of time they voted with the Democratic Party increased dramatically. For example, in the 111th Senate, Arlen Specter voted to table Republican amendments around 42% of the time before his switch. After his switch, he voted to table

Republican amendments at a 95% clip. To be sure, a change in party may be associated with a change in social network, but the co-variation between relationships and party status would only further prove our point.[22]

Finally, the words of senators on the floor during debate support the notion that parties play a crucial role in shaping vote choice and outcomes. In the following quote from Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR), we see evidence from the chamber floor during a debate over a tabling motion that party leaders do indeed influence members' votes: "My proposed amendment ought to get 100 votes in the U. S. Senate, but it will not. People will walk up the door and up to the manager and say, 'What is our vote on this?' Well, they will not have to ask, they know what there is. They know there has been a motion to table every single amendment. What kind of democracy is that?" (*Congressional Record*, February 24, 1995).

Clearly, political parties do influence the behavior of rank and file members on the floor. While this influence pales in comparison to the role parties play in the House, parties still matter on the Senate floor. To be sure, a significant amount of legislative activity in the Senate occurs away from the floor, but this does not diminish the usefulness of analyzing floor activity. We acknowledge that the Senate is different from the House in that chamber leaders make important decisions away from the floor, such as negotiating unanimous consent agreements (Ainsworth and Flathman 1995); however, we also understand that a systematic analysis of all the Senate's backroom dealings would be impossible. We can only exploit what the *Congressional Record* provides us and what transpires in the public eye. Furthermore, it is clear in this analysis that major decisions are made on the Senate floor. We capture these decisions and then show that party makes an important impact beyond ideology. If we were able to include analyses of all things visible and invisible in the Senate, we would expect the impact of party on the chamber to grow.

Although we have found strong evidence of the role that party plays on the floor in these types of votes, it is important to note that this is not the only place where we expect majority party influence. As we have mentioned, the majority party wields influence on cloture votes, but we also see similar evidence of influence on votes dealing with budgetary points of order. The diversity of procedural tools the majority party uses reflects a more active party leadership that is always searching for more efficient and beneficial ways to tilt outcomes in their favor. In the future, we hope to give these tools the same attention that we give to MTTs here in order to test whether party plays such a large role in determining their use.

In this analysis, we provide new evidence regarding the significant role that parties play in the Senate, an arena about which many observers remain skeptical. We show that party influences outcomes beyond like-minded ide-

ological disposition and mere numerical advantage. The patterns displayed in our regression analysis support the theory that the majority party uses this tool at a disproportionate rate and are very successful disposing of unwanted amendments. We then examine individual vote pairs and show that the party of individual offering the MTT and the sponsor of the underlying amendment influence the likelihood of switching votes. Although the probability of switching is small for each individual, in the aggregate, motions to table dispose of some amendments that would otherwise pass. Just as a switching analysis regarding special rules bolstered the evidence of party effects in the House, this analysis of motions to table amendments adds to the evidence that political parties matter in the Senate.

The Senate will not reach the partisan nature of the House; however, we believe we have marshaled clear evidence to add to the growing number of voices on Capitol Hill, in the press, and in academia that the Senate is indeed a partisan institution.

NOTES

1. Quote appeared in an article written by Senator Snowe titled, "Why I'm Leaving the Senate", published on March 2, 2012, by Reader Supported News, available online at http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/270-37/10252-focus-why-im-leaving-the-senate.
2. As explained in more detail in our theoretical perspective, by party effects or party influence, we are referring to outcomes that come about due to party leaders, as agents of their party caucus, using any strategy (or multiple strategies) to elicit support from rank and file members to work towards the collective goals (either policy or electoral) of the party.
3. If members treated procedural and substantive votes identically, we might expect someone that does not support a bill would vote for the motion to recommit and then vote against the bill on final passage.
4. We acknowledge that the process by which amendments from the majority and minority parties emerge on the floor differs. A minority party amendment might seek to kill a bill, yet an amendment from an ideological member of the majority party is more likely to alter the policy content of the legislation. Still, a majority of senators may find both types of amendments unpalatable.
5. To be sure, motions to table are a form of negative agenda control. Senators can use these motions to stop something from happening. If party leaders hope to influence votes in order to achieve policy ends, the motion to table provides little assistance other than supporting the status quo.
6. When we say votes are partisan, we mean these votes pit a majority of one party against a majority of the other party. For more information on the evolving usage of MTT over time, see Carson et al. (2011), Goodman (2010), and King, Orlando, and Rohde (2012).
7. As a helpful anonymous reviewer pointed out, motions are typically either "agreed to" or "adopted." Here we use "passage" to remain consistent with other research on Motions to Table Amendments (such as Den Hartog and Monroe 2008a). Similarly, we use the term "motioner" (versus "mover") to indicate the senator offering the motion to table.
8. It is possible that some congresses are more likely to pass tabling motions than others are, so we include an indicator variable for each Congress in our dataset (91st–111th). It is also possible that the sheer size of the majority party leads to more success motions to table amendments. In an attempt to control for the size of the majority, we ran this model with a count variable for each seat the majority party occupied above 50. The coefficient on this variable was never significant, nor did it affect the substantive results of the model. This adds credibility to our estimate of party influence as the passage of motions to table is not the result of the majority party having more members than the minority party.

9. This hypothesis received additional support after we ran a similar model for only majority sponsored MTTs. In this specification, committee chairs also have a higher rate of MTT passage than rank and file members.
10. The baseline category for this model is a minority backbencher. Unless otherwise noted, we estimate marginal effects with other variables held at their means.
11. For example, while a vote on special rules in the House may affect a vote on a specific amendment indirectly, a motion to table an amendment is concerned explicitly with that amendment.
12. For comparison, from the 91st to the 111th Senate, 53% of all amendments failed.
13. We exclude members who did not vote on the MTT and/or the amendment.
14. This table splits vote pairs by the majority status of the underlying amendment, but does not differentiate the sponsor of the MTT. We chose to compare vote pairs in this fashion as most motions to table target amendments of the opposite party. In addition, these amendments are the most dangerous to goals of each party.
15. We include an indicator variable for each Congress and each bill subject to a failed MTT vote and a recorded amendment vote. This controls for the possibility that vote switching is more common in some Congresses than others, and that vote switching might occur more frequently on some bills.
16. We ran several specifications to account for vulnerability and electoral factors. We included an individual's previous vote margin and whether that Senator was up for reelection. The variables were never significant, and there were not any substantive changes to the other coefficients. At the same time, we understand these crude measures cannot account for all the intricacies of each legislator and their district.
17. Based off DW-Nominate scores in the 111th Senate: Russ Feingold (D-WI) = -.806; Evan Bayh (D-IN) = -.171; Olympia Snowe (R-ME) = .045; Tom Coburn (R-OK) = .930.
18. Each member has a probability of vote switching based on the results of our models and the characteristics surrounding the MTT. For example, if a legislator has a 10% chance of switching, in 9 out of 10 simulations he or she will vote consistently. By simulating 1000 votes, we approximate the odds of success for the underlying amendment. In each simulation, we drew from a random uniform distribution (0 to 1) and recorded whether a switched vote occurs for each senator. Then, we looked across the 1,000 simulations on each amendment to determine in how many instances the Senate would have agreed to the underlying amendment.
19. Especially compared to support and confidence in large corporations, the public is much more sympathetic to small businesses. See Polling Report for some public opinion data: http://www.pollingreport.com/institut.htm
20. Smith, Ostrander, and Pope (2013) refer to this as the "weak party" theory.
21. Provisions in a unanimous consent agreement may limit the time for debate on a bill or an amendment. If this is the case, a motion to table is not in order under this debate is over. For a brief summary of Senate procedural tools, see Beth and Heitshusen (2013).
22. The difference of means test for Sen. Specter's behavior before and after his party switch is statistically significant beyond the .01 level. When comparing Sen. Jeffords' behavior in dealing with the amendments of the opposite party, his support of these MTTs changes from 50% to 88% support, which is also significant at the .01 level.

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